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The BAROMETER is a student newspaper for the exchange of ideas and 
information concerning the development and improvement of the 
professional environment at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
+*+*+*+*+*+*+*+ 
"Nuclear-powered submarines, which do not give away speed to surface 
ships, can also be used for ASW defense of surface combatants and 
merchantmen. They are capable of "clearing" a path for forces of 
combatants or convoys (e.g., in "moving screens"), fulfilling the 
function of an undersea escort, or of carrying out a preliminary 
search of the combat operational areas of carrier attach forces. 
Moreover, they can prosecute the mission of seeking out and destroying 
enemy submarines in the zone of movement in support of their own FBM 
submarines. Thus, the Americans believe that it would be difficult 
for the enemy to determine precisely what kind of submarine contact 
he has made when FBM and attack submarines are employed jointly." 
Captain 1st Rank Kostev (MORSOY SBORNIK - SOVIET NAVAL DIGEST, October, 1973) 
EDITORIAL COMMENT: Once again The BAROMETER's FEATURE comes from the SOVIET NAVAL DIGEST, 
MORSKOY SBORNIK, from an article by Captain 1st Rank Kostev on submarines. Even though 
the paper has historical and common sense references from the Soviet and foreign press as 
its fundamental information subtle implications of tactics are evident. 
FEATURE: THE BATTLE UNDER WATER 
"In the First World War submarines loudly proclaimed themselves to be a formidable force 
in warfare at sea. The German submariners alone destroyed a_total of 13.2 million tons of 
merchant shipping and sunk 12 battleships, 23 cruisers, 39 destroyers, and dozens of other 
combatants -- a total of 162 combat units. 
The result of the submarine activities forced the belligerents to immediately take 
measures against the submarine menace. A determined struggle had begun -- not for life 
but for death -- between the submarine and antisubmarine forces. 
Beginning in September 1915 the British began to divert their own submarines to the 
oat tIe with the "corsairs of the depths." In 1917 about 100 submarines (Le., practically 
all of those in the inventory of the British Navy at that time) participated in it, sinking 
21 German submarines. 
How high the effectiveness of the ASW operations of the submarines was becomes 
especially evident if one considers that the countries of the Entente employed more than 
5000 ships and 2500 aircraft and planted some 137,000 mines for this purpose alone to 
prosecute ASW missions. 
These were the main methods of employing submarines against submarines: patrolling 
off the enemy shores, "ambushing" his submarines en route to their deployment, and cruising 
in the area of their combat activities. Patrolling close to hostile bases proved to be 
the most successful. 
The effectiveness of operations by submarine against their own kind forced England to 
construct special "undersea destroyers" -- the R-Class submarines. They had a very high 
submerged speed for that day (up to 15 knots), a small displacement (surface displacement 
about 370 tons) a small reserve buoyancy (about 16%) and good maneuverability (owing to 
the enlarged area of the planes). However, due to the fact that these submarines entered 
the fleet inventory only at the end of the war, they did not manage to fully test their 
combat capabilities. 
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In the period between the two world wars the development of ASW submarines was slowed 
down, because many naval authorities of the Western powers assumed that surface ships 
possess greater capabilities in combatting the undersea menace. At the base of this 
opinion lay the conviction that submarines are incapable of engaging one another since 
"they can't see each other." 
In the course of World War II submarines of foreign navies were not systematically 
employed in ASW operations. As a result, the success of this form of operation dropped 
in comparison with World War I. 
It is interesting that in this period not only were there no new trends in the 
development and employment of submarines to combat submarines, but there was not even 
any attempt to create combatants with this type of profile. This is explained to some 
degree by the widespread employment of new ASW forces -- aircraft -- which achieved great ~ 
success. 
Despite the rather furious development of ASW forces and means during the war, submarines 
of foreign navies destroyed 22.1 million tons of merchant shipping and sank 395 combatants. 
By the end of the war a kind of equilibrium had set in in the battle between submarines 
and surface ASW forces and the foreign navies returned to the idea of creating special ASW 
submarines. Soon after the end of the war the USA began to construct such submarines, which 
received the designation SSK (Submarine Hunter Killer). In 1949 the US Navy created a group 
of specialists to develop tactics for them. By 1952 the first ASW submarines of the 
BARRACUDA Class had entered service. After testing them the Americans came to the 
conclusion that such submarines were one of the more effective ASW means of this period. 
In 1953 France also began to build ASW submarines of the ARETHUSE Class. In England 
T-Class submarines were converted to ASW submarines. 
However the FBM submarines which appeared rendered the diesel-powered "Sub-Killers" 
"toothless". Therefore, the Americans refrained from further construction of special ASW 
submarines (with the exception of the nuclear-powered TULLIBEE). Later one of the main 
missions of attack submarines (especially nuclear-powered ones) became antisubmarine war-
fare according to the principle "Sink all subs", regardless of whether it be a guided-
missile or an attack submarine (it was practically impossible to claSSify them from their 
noises) . 
In connection with this, the USA began to accent work on upgrading existing means of 
sonar detection of any enemy submarine and creating new ones, and also took immediate 
measures to reduce machinery noise. Later various modifications of the submarine torpedo 
weaponry appeared which were capable of homing on an undersea target located at a depth 
unattainable by conventional torpedoes. These were torpedoes with passive and active 
homing in two planes and wire-guided torpedoes. The US Navy introduced a new problem into 
the combat training course for all submarines: combatting the enemy's submarines. 
Soon American and other NATO admirals came to the conclusion that the nuclear-powered 
submarine armed with special torpedoes is the best form of force to detect and destroy 
hostile submarines in the ocean. "As surface ship battles surface ship, and aircraft 
battles aircraft, thus the nuclear-powered submarine will also become a more effective 
weapon in ASW," stated Admiral I. Galatin in viewing the prospects for the undersea 
battle with submarines. 
Today a majority of the nuclear-powered attach submarines of foreign navies are multi-
purpose submarines, but one of their main missions is ASW in the ocean. In this connection -
some foreign naval specialists believe that in today's context the nuclear-powered attack 
submarine plays the main role in combatting the enemy's submarine forces and that they are 
"the most important ASW ship". The increase of submarine submergence depth and speed in 
the postwar period has been of great importance in increasing the role of submarines. The 
French Admiral P. Barjot points out: "The sharp increase in submarine speed could lead to 
the fact that a majority of the ships armed with sonar will become ineffective." The 
American Naval expert J. Mariot asserts that at speeds greater than 25 knots and in a storm 
surface ship sonar gear will become practically useless. Moreover, he and other bourgeois 
theoreticians believe that surface ships cannot detect and track high speed submarines 
moving at a depth of 500 m and greater, and consequently submarines will be practically 
invulnerable. That is why the best means of combatting them will be submarines themselves 
high-speed noiseless submarines equipped with good sonar gear and special weaponry. In 
connection with this P. Barjot expressed the thought that "The undersea depths will turn 
out to be the combat arena in a future war." 
Thus, the improvement in the performance characteristics of submarines (and above all 
the introduction of nuclear power) has led to the situation defined as the "underwater battle~' 
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Presently two basic types of nuclear-powered submarines have been c learly defined: 
guided missile and attack (multipurpose) submarines, whereby the main mission of the latter 
is the destruction of the former. The struggle of these two types of submarines, the duel 
of their representatives in the ocean depths, is the basic form of the "underwater battle." 
The experience of past wars attests to the fact that the main attention in naval warfare 
is devoted, as a rule, to actions against the main naval striking forces (in World War I --
against battleships, in World War II -- against carriers). In a nuclear-missile war, it is 
felt abroad, the main efforts of the navies will be directed toward the destruction of FBM 
submarines and carrier attack forces. Therefore, as the foreign press indicates, the 
question is very quickly arising of further increasing the effectiveness of attack submarine 
operations and improving their combat qualities. It is a question of concealment, permitting 
them to be located in enemy waters or in the zone of his active operations and to engage 
submarine forces using the factor of surprise for the attack. This also refers to the 
capability to operate regardless of the weather and utilizing favorable sea conditions to 
increase the range for detecting undersea targets with sonar gear. 
The ASW forces of the imperialist navies in the early 1970's numbe r about 300 attack 
submarines, including 50 nuclear-powered submarines (the Americans have 61 diesel and 46 
nuclear submarines ; . Presently, after the construction of 36 STURGEON-Class submarines, 
the Americans are beginning series production of the new SSN-688-Class multipurpose nuclear-
powered submarines. 
The basic trends in the development of submarines are the reduction in their noise level, 
and an increase in the submerged speed and submergence depth. Practical results opening up 
great prospects have been achieved in all three directions. Thus, the American nuclear 
submarine PERMIT, built in 1966, has a noise level almost one and a half times less than 
the SKIPJACK, a submarine of the same class but built in 1961. The submerged speed of 
nuclear-powered submarines today is essentially equal to the speed of the ASW surface ships 
and, in the opinion of foreign experts, in the near future will exceed it by 20--30 knots 
(excluding ships with dynamic principles of sustentati0n). However, a speed of even 60 
knots is not considered the limit for submarines. 
Since the possibility of effectively evading ASW surface ships and the weaponry employed 
by them increases sharply with depth, a great deal of attention is being devoted to increasing 
submarine submergence depth abroad. Thus, in 1964 the American experimental submarine 
ALUMINAUT dived to 4580 m, and in 1968 the experimental submarine DOLPHIN submerged to 1200 m 
and at that time checked the possibility of firing a torpedo at a depth of 1000 m. It is 
assumed that a combat deep-diving submarine with a torpedo armament will appear after 1980. 
One additional trend in the development of multipurpose submarines is a reduction in 
their size. Thus, the US has recently been conducting work on creating "midgets" with a 
great submergence depth. In 1969 this type of "midget", the NRl, was built (400 ton 
displacement) which is capable of diving to 1000 m. 
ASW tactics are also radically changing. Previously during the search, their detection 
while at periscope depth or on the surface (charging batteries) played the primary role. 
Now, however, ,.ith the appearance of nuclear power, the search over vast oceanic spaces is 
being carried out by ASW aircraft and high-speed ships with in3trum~nts which react to the 
various physical fields of the submarine located at a great depth. 
Already the experience of World War II has shown that actions against submarines must 
not have so much of a defensive nature, but rather they must be of an offensive character. 
The defensive character of operations does not permit ASW forces to fully prosecute the 
mission of combatting the submarine menace which threatened forces of combatants and 
transports in World War II. According to foreign experts, success is possible only when 
ASW forces combine offensive and defensive operations, with the attack submarines being 
in the front line. In this connection, the basic methods of employing them are considered 
to be" patrolling in assigned regions, operations in barriers, and in mobile screens. 
According to information in the foreign press, attack submarines, in prosecuting the 
ASW mission, must operate mainly jointly with other ASW forces. As early as 1958 the US 
formed the ASW hunter-killer group ALPHA, and later groups BRAVO and CHARLEY. They were 
composed of shore-based patrol aircraft, ASW carriers and other surface ships, and also 
attack (in this case antisubmarine) submarines. 
The search for the undersea enemy was prosecuted by the attack submarine in concert with 
an aircraft which patrolled over the search area and attacked the detected target on the 
basis of data from the submarine. In joint operations with surface ships, the submarine 
carried out the search for the target and vectored ships to it which were maneuvering at 
a distance to eliminate the noise created by the surface ships. Sometimes a submarine was 
employed to classify a submarine target detected by an aircraft. 
The American Admiral D. Touch stated in 1963: "We are convinced, and this has been 
confirmed in practice, that combined ASW forces (of surface ships, submarines, and aircraft) 
are more effective in combatting submrines than ASW forces consisting of type forces." 
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Joint operations between attack submarines and other ASW forces demand well developed 
communications organization which requires the overcoming of great difficulties. Never-
theless, in this area some results have been achieved and presently the range for this type 
of communications has reached 20 km. Experiments are being conducted on maintaing communi-
cations between a submarine and an aircraft with the aid of sonobuoys. It is believed abroad 
that an improvement can be expected in joint operations between submarines, aircraft, and 
surface ships with the establishment of reliable two-way communications and with the employ-
ment of a reliable high-speed IFF system. The fulfillment of the above conditions is 
especially important, according to foreign experts, in joint operations between submarines 
and aircraft, since the failure to observe them could lead to attacks against own submarines. 
The US Navy and the NATO Allied Naval Forces systematically conduct integrated exercises 
to seek out and destroy an enemy submarine especially at barriers in order to develop the 
organization of joint operations between attack submarines and other ASW forces. As early ,~ 
as 1963 joint operations between attack submarines and seven squadrons of ASW aircraft block-
ing the breakthrough into the Atlantic from the north by enemy submarines were worked out 
along the Iceland-Shetland Islands barrier. The intensity of these exercises is growing 
every year. 
The development of joint operations between attack submarines, and aircraft and surface 
ships in seeking out and destroying FBM submarines occupies a significant place in the combat 
training of foreign navies. Such exercises were conducted in 1967 by NATO Allied Naval Forces 
under the codename QUICK PIROUETTE (?), north of the Faero Islands, and in 1968 under the 
codename UNITAS IX, by US and Latin American naval forces in the coastal waters of America. 
In October 1972 major NATO naval maneuvers took place in the Mediterranean under the codename 
DEPTH CHARGE, in which methods of detecting and destroying submarines were worked out (not 
long before they began, a US Sixth Fleet nuclear submarine base was built on the Italian 
island of La Maddalena). 
According to statements by foreign experts in the press, attack submarines must prevent 
penetration by enemy submarine forces into the operational area and also must destroy them 
in these areas. 
In the first case, the attack submarines monitor certain barrier lines (i.e., points of 
the most probably passage of enemy guided-missile submarines during their deployment). The 
patrolling is carried out at the lowest speed in the sector assigned to each attack submarine 
and is prosecuted jointly with aircraft and surface ships. 
In the second instance, attack submarines are granted "free hunting" rights in an area 
where enemy submarines are assumed to be located (the foreign press sometimes calls this 
"spontaneous aggressive operations". This method can also be employed to combat nuclear 
submarines detected in the ocean with the aid of long range ASW surveillance systems and 
also in areas off of enemy bases. 
The essence of "free hunting" lies in the fact that an attack submarine can maneuver 
at low speed submerged (or hover at a depth with no way on) in the area of the probably 
location of the attack target, conduct surveillance by echo rating, and upon detection of 
the target, immediately attack it. "Free hunting" is prosecuted alone or in a group. 
Nuclear-powered submarines, which do not give away speed to surface ships, can also be 
used for ASW defense of surface combatanats and merchantmen. They are capable of "clearing" 
a path for forces of combatants or convoys (e.g., in "moving screens"), fulfilling the 
function of an undersea escort, or of carrying out a preliminary search of the combat 
operational areas or carrier attack forces. Moreover, they can prosecute the mission of 
seeking out and destroying enemy submarines in the zone of movement in support of their own 
FBM submarines. Thus, the Americans believe that it would be difficult for the enemy to 
determine precisely what kind of submarine contact he has made when FBM and attack submarines 
are employed jointly. 
In the opinion of foreign specialists, attack submarines will yet show their own super-
iority over destroyers as screening forces, but this will necessitate radical changes in 
the methods of their combat employment. One of these forms will evidently be a dueling 
situation, predetermining the outbreak of undersea battles between submarines. As bourgeois 
theoreticians assert, the current level of development of submarine forces has given a new 
spatial dimension to naval engagements in which he who first hears the enemy will be 
victorious. "Based on all information existing today, the real enemy of submarines will 
be the submarine itself, and undoubtedly the nuclear-powered submarine will be that type 
of enemy." 
Actually the capabilities of undersea combatants to engage combatants similar to them-
selves in the ocean depths are increasing very rapidly and are already rather great today. 
However, as many Western naval theoreticians believe, although nuclear-powered attack sub-
marines have a great role in combatting the enemy submarine forces, they will never be able 
to fully prosecute this mission alone. Therefore, the USA and other imperialist countries 
are engaged in building up mixed ASW forces and developing joint operations between them 
thoroughly." 
